Introduction 1
The normative foundations of law have been widely debated among researchers. 1 Utilitarianism implies maximization of social welfare which is a (weighted) sum of individual utilities. POSNER [1979] highlights the weaknesses of utilitarianism in the economic analysis of law: apart for its shortcomings as a system of ethics and morality, an individual utilities based social welfare function also has serious shortcomings in guiding social and legal decisions , because of its difficulties associated with interpersonal comparison and aggregation of individual utilities. Posner proposes that the purpose of law is social wealth maximization, as " it provides a firmer basis for a normative theory of law than utilitarianism" (POSNER [1979, 103] ).
Although legal decision-making in real life is not based on individual utilities 2 , social wealth maximization is also an over-simplified view for legal decision-making.
DWORKIN [1980] argues that wealth is neither a value nor an instrument of social value.
Some critical legal studies, for example, FITAPATRICK and HUNT [1987] , assert that law systematically protects the interests of the more socially valued parties, thus does not maximize social wealth. CALABRESI [1985, 69] argues that:
" Who is the cheapest avoider of a cost, depends on the valuations put on acts, activities, and beliefs by the whole of our law and not on some objective or scientific notion". "What is efficient, or passes a cost-benefit test, is not a 'scientific' notion separated from beliefs and attitudes, and always must respond to the question of who we wish to make richer or poorer."
In this paper we use the resource allocations, instead of individual utilities, as the consequence space for social welfare. We justify the use of such social welfare functions by the social rationality over resource allocations, as rationality and consistency are basic a social value for each individual and a social attitude towards distributional inequality.
In normative economics, researchers usually use welfarist social welfare functions. 3 For example, the famous HARSANYI's [1955] social aggregation theorem uses the P areto indifference principle to obtain a social welfare function that is a weighted sum of individual utilities, and claims that it provides support for utilitarianism.
Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem has been established for many different formulations (see BLACKORBY, DONALDSON, AND WEYMARK [1999] and references in the paper). However, the resource based social welfare function has some very useful features.
First, the resource based social welfare function reveals important social value judgments. The weights in the social welfare function are uniquely determined, intrinsic to the relevant social preference, and they represent the social values of individuals 4 (the same as the weights in the subjective expected utility derived from Savage's axioms which reveal an individual's belief about the probability of each state). The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of function u in the social welfare function can represent social attitude towards distributional inequality. Alt hough much can be said about the ethical and moral issues using the type of social welfare function, we restrict our discussion to its simple application in the economic analysis of law. We consider two hot debates: whether wealth is a social value and whether punitive damage s should be awarded in tort law if there is no possibility of avoid ing compensations. It is pretty easy to see that welfare maximization is equivalent to wealth maximization and thus wealth become a social value, only if all individuals have equal social values and the society does not care about distributional inequality.
In standard economic analysis of tort law, due precaution level is determined by maximizing total social wealth, and the award of damage compensation is equal to the actual damage. POLINSKY AND SHAVELL [1998] argue that punitive damage s are 4 " The social value of each individual" may also be named as social influence, or social power of each individual. We didn't see an accepted terminology for this weight. However, it should not be confused with the individual value as in ARROW' s [1951] "Social choice and individual values". 5 The welfare function utilized in this paper can be generalized to situations without independent axioms and can incorporate explicitly the envy or altruism in the social welfare function (GILBOA AND SCHMEIDL ER [1994] ).
awarded only because the injurers can avoid paying compensations with some probabilit y.
However, C OOTER AND ULEN [1988] argue that punitive damages are necessary because some benefits that are not sanctioned by law could be categorized as illicit and therefore can not be incorporated into a social welfare function. 6 Some studies have argued that punitive damages are necessary because they serve as a deterrence and/or retribution.
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Simple analysis using resource based social welfare function shows that if the injurer is valued less than the victim by the society, the society imposes a due precaution level that is stricter than the one that maximizes social wealth. Punitive damages must be awarded to induce the due precaution, and tort law implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued party to the more socially valued party. Therefore, punitive damage awards are needed because of the social value judgments. We also provide an explanation of the arbitrariness of the exact amount of punitive damage award (DANIELS and MARTIN [1990] ) by its sensitivity to the error in social value estimations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of rational social choice and the value judgments in the social welfare function. Section 3 contains an application of the proposed social welfare function to two debates in the economic analysis of law. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. can be reinterpreted to model the rationality of social decision-making over resource allocations.
Savage theorem (SAVAGE [1948] ) considers the rationality of individual choices facing risk. There is a state space Ω representing all possible states of the word, a set C of consequences and an act space } : 
represent the decision-maker's subjective belief about the probability of the states and the function u represents her attitude towards risk.
Therefore, an individual's choices reveal her belief about the probability of each state and her attitude towards risk.
Savage axioms can be reinterpreted in a social decision setting. Each element of Ω represents a member of the society. An element c of the space C describes the amount of resource that a social member can get. The space F represents all possible resource allocations among social members: an element F f ∈ (a mapping from Ω to C ) specifying the resource allocated to each individual . A rational society has preferences over different resource allocations and it chooses the optimal resource allocation in a decision-making. 
Together with three other 3 postulates concerning about the boundedness and continuity of the welfare function (see SHAFER [1986, 468] 
where µ is a unique probability measure on the space Ω , the function u is bounded, continuous, and unique to an affine transformation, and µ E represents the expectation with respect to µ .
If the society has a finite number of members, then any allocation can be written
and the subjective social welfare function can be written as
We now discuss the postulates for the social rationality over resource allocations.
The last three postulates are more technical and are not restated here; they do not impose significant constraints on the social rationality. Postulate 1 assumes that the society can rank all possible resource allocations. Postulate 2 is the most controversial in Savage's theorem. Before turning back to it, we first discuss Postulates 3 and 4.
Consider two equal resource allocations: in allocation 1 each individual has resource c while in allocation 2 each individual has resource d . Postulate 3 states that if a society prefers allocation 1 to allocation 2, then, when constrained to the resource allocations among any sub-group of social members A , the society should still prefer 9 In fact, Savage's theorem normally assumes that the space Ω is infinite. As indicated by GUL [1992] , some of Savage's postulates require technical modification when Ω is finite. allocation 1 to allocation 2. For the special case where A has a single member, } {s A = , i.e., when a social decision only affects a single individual, the preference ordering over the resource allocations is the same for any member, and the identity of the member is irrelevant to the ordering.
In Postulate A complete discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
To explore the economic intuition of the parameter in the social welfare function, we c onsider a problem of the income redistribution among n parties:
. Without loss of generality, we
If u is strictly convex, the optimal allocation leads to a corner solution where the first member receives all resource while the rest receive nothing. If u is strictly concave, from the first order condition The obtained social welfare function is subjective to a society. DE FINETTI [1964] has formed the basis of the subjective probability. A probability does not have to be the objective frequency of an event; it represents the individual belief of the event. In our subjective social welfare function, social values of the individuals express the perceptions of the society about who is more important (or more valuable). Social value judgments, such as the individual social values and the social attitude towards distributional inequality, are not objective a nd universal, and do not have to be imposed on all societies.
As the perception of a society, these value judgments are determined by the current political and social environments, past social experiences and institutional constraints, and they describe "w hat is" instead of "what should be" in guiding social decisions.
Different societies have different value judgments. Therefore, the value judgments included in the social welfare function have no meaning except when related to a specified society.
The resource based social welfare function has its advantages in guiding the social decision-making. Resource allocations are observable and often verifiable, and there is no need to estimate and aggregate the individual utility, as in welfarist welfare functions.
Another advantage is that there is a clear separation of individual social values and the social attitude towards distributional inequality. Such separation in the social welfare function will be very useful in future analysis of social decision-making, even though in the following we only need to consider a distributional inequality neutral society.
This non-welfarist social welfare function has a similar welfarist version. In
Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem (see BLACKORBY et al. [1999] and reference in that paper), the strong Pareto plus an additional preference diversity condition 11 also imply a social welfare function represented by a weighted sum of individual utilities with unique positive weights. However, unlike our social welfare function that has a clear economic interpretation, there is much controversy in the interpretation and the significance of Harsanyi's theorem. Since individual utilities used in the aggregation are ordinary, any increasing function of the individual utilities also represents the same individual preferences. In order that Harsanyi's theorem makes any economic sense, the individual utilities must be able to be compared interpersonally, a topic with a large amount of literature but also lots of disagreements.
MONGIN [2000] observes that economists have started to reorient social choice theory into a non-welfarist direction and he suggests a " fourth stage of normative economics" . 12 Although the social welfare function used here is not welfarist, it does not provide any argument to imply that welfarist should be rejected. Intuitively, a society has no good reason to reject policies that improve the well-being of each social member, and the Pareto indifference principle should still hold. Welfarist approach and the approach 11 The condition is equivalent to requiring the individual utility functions to be affinely independent. 12 MONGIN [2000] provides some recent interesting arguments against the sufficiency and the necessity of individual utility for social welfare. The argument against sufficiency can be made in terms of socially undesirable aspirations, and the case against the necessity is expedited by taking note of those highly desirable objective achievements, good health, real freedom, etc.
based solely on resource allocations are two different ways to look at the social decisionmaking. However, these two approaches are not completely compatible. I n a recent paper, BLACKORBY et al. [2002] shows that when the domain of a social evaluation func tional consists of multiple profiles of both welfare and no n-welfare information, any evaluation principle with unlimited domain, Pareto indifference and binary independence of irrelevant alternatives 13 must ignore non-welfare information. In other words, a ny principle for social evaluation with unlimited domain and binary independence of irrelevant alternatives that uses non-welfare information must fail to satisfy Pareto indifference. The resource based social welfare function in this paper has the domain that contains only non-welfare information, so it does not have to violate Pareto indifference.
We believe further study can provide a better understanding of the relationship between welfarist and non-welfarist social welfare functions.
One might criticize the resource allocation based welfare function because it does not consider how social preferences are formed. Actually, social preferences are the outcomes of fighting among individuals and the interactions of many other factors. But we can still imagine that a social preference as well as individual preferences over resource allocations satisfies Savage axioms, and we then try to aggregate individual preferences into the social preference, as in HARSANYI [1955] . Such an aggregation problem is equivalent to the problem of: (a) aggregating different individual views on social influence into a single social influence and (b) aggregating different individual attitudes towards distributional inequality into a single social attitude towards 13 Binary independence of irrelevant alternatives requires the social ranking of any two alternatives to depend on the utility information and non-welfare information associated with those two alternatives only. 
Application to economic analysis of law
The social welfare function established in the previous section can be used straightforwardly to shed lights on standard debates in law and economics. We consider two most debated topics : the purpose of law and the award of punitive damages.
Is wealth maximization the purpose of law?
Individuals are selfish, and they maximize their own utilities. For activities with significant externalities (either positive or negative) and high transaction costs, some kinds of social decisions have to be made. Legal decisions choose actions (or action rules) that are considered to be optimal for the society, but may not be optimal for each individual.
14 MONGIN [1995] considered the aggregation of preferences satisfying Savage's axioms. When considering the aggregation of relative social influence without considering the social attitude toward distributional inequality, affine rule is the only solution. When we consider the aggregation of relative social influence together with aggregating attitude toward distributional inequality, dictatorial rule is the only solution with weak Pareto condition. With strong Pareto condition, there does not exist any solution.
Suppose that the society chooses an activity e from a set E of possible actions. The above discussion can be summarized as:
Proposition 2: All legal decision-making involves a social value for each individual and a social attitude towards distributional inequality. Legal decision-making can be described by welfare maximization, which is equivalent to wealth maximization only if all parties are valued equally and the society does not care about distributional inequality in the decision-making.
POSNER [1979] claims that the efficiency in economic analysis of law is equivalent to wealth maximization and suggests that wealth maximization seems to be a more defendable principle than utilitarianism. DWORKIN [1980] argues that wealth is neither a value nor an instrument of social value. The above proposition indicates that, in certain cases, social wealth is a defendable social value.
Efficient precaution level and damage compensation in tort law
As another application to the economic analysis of law, we consider the determination of due precaution levels and the award of compensation in tort law.
Because of the conflicts between the social preference and individual preferences, societies use their coercive powers to change individual choices. In tort law, a society specifies a due precaution level and uses compensations to induce individuals to behave in a manner that is consistent with welfare maximization. In the following, we show that the difference in individual social values can lead to precaution level and damage compensations that are very different from the ones that maximize social wealth in the standard economic analysis of law.
For simplicity, we consider a case with only two parties: an injurer and a victim.
The injurer chooses precaution level a that leads to a resource allocation between the injurer and the victim:
In tort law we can reasonably assume that the society does not care about distributional inequality, i.e., u is linear. The social welfare function associated with the precaution level a is:
where 1 λ and 2 λ are the social values of the injurer and the victim, respectively.
In the extreme case when the social value of one member approaches 0, her wealth will be ignored in calculating social welfare. COOTER AND ULEN [1988] examine such a case where wealth acquired by some parties through illegal means is not included in total social wealth.
In most cases of contract and tort law, social members have equal chance to play different roles in possible legal disputes and all parties of a legal dispute tend to have the same social value. Therefore, wealth maximization can be considered as the basis for legal decision-makings. This can explain why most contract and tort law cases are decided without an explicit reference to value judgment issues. However, historically or due to interest group activities, the group of injurers and the group of victims may have different social values in some tort cases, in which wealth maximization is no longer consistent with welfare maximization.
For a precaution level a , the revenue and the cost function of the injurer are ) (a R and ) (a C , respectively, where
. A higher level of precaution reduces profit of the injurer. At the same time, the action causes a fixed damage D to a potential injurer with probability ) (a p . A higher level of precaution reduces the probability of an accident but at a decreasing rate:
The action with precaution level a results in an expected allocation ) , (
The social welfare associated with the precaution level a is:
The optimal level of precaution * a is determined by the first order conditio n:
. Therefore, the socially efficient precaution level * a is determined by:
On the other hand, t he wealth maximizing precaution level 0 a (which corresponds to the case of 2 / 1 2 1 = = λ λ ), is determined by:
Without the imposition of compensations, the injurer does not consider the externality imposed on the victim. The preferred precaution level for the injurer is 0. To increase the precaution level, the s ociety must provide incentives to the injurer by imposing an award of damage K to force h er internalize the externality. 17 Given the damage compensation, the injurer's profit after compensation is
. If the injurer's utility function is an increasing function of the profit, the injurer chooses the action satisfying:
value of an individual depends on her actions. 17 Under a negligence rule, the injurer pays compensation K only if her precaution level is less than the due care level. Under a strict liability rule, the injurer pays compensation K once damage occurs. From the standard economic analysis of law, both a negligence rule and a strict liability rule induce the socially optimal precaution. the socially optimal level of precaution, the compensation should be set to :
There are three different cases for the due precaution level and for the compensation:
, the injurer has a higher social value), by comparing (5) and (6) value of the injurer is smaller than that of the victim, the due precaution level is more strict than the wealth maximizing precaution level and punitive damages will be awarded.
18 and using the fact that
In the standard law and economic analysis, punitive damages can be awarded only if there is a possibility that the injurer can avoid compensations. The amount of compensation is equal to the value of loss multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability that the defendant can escape from compensations (see POLINSKY AND SHAVELL [1998] ). However, a large number of cases involve a situation where the probability of compensation is very high and punitive damages are still awarded (for instance in cases of assaults, pollutions, etc). Our simple analysis shows that the punitive damage award is possible even without the possibility of avoiding compensations. The punitive damage award is the consequence of different social values of the injurer and the victim. Therefore, the punitive damage award is normally associated with social value judgment s.
19
Most literature on tort compensations focuses on the award of full or punitive damages. Our analysis shows that less than full compensation is also possible 20 . In the case of less than the full compensation, the action of the injurer is often regarded as accidental or inevitable.
Next, we consider the expected post-compensation resource allocations. It is easy to see that under a strict liability rule, the payoff of the injurer is proportional to the social
, whereas the payoff of the victim is proportional to the actual damage:
the victim has a lower social value than the injurer (i.e., 2 / 1 1 > λ ), she always ends up with a negative payoff. If the victim has a higher social value than the injurer (i.e., 2 / 1 1 < λ ), then she always ends up with a positive payoff; alternatively, part of the injurer's wealth is transferred to the victim in this case. A strict liability rule actually transfers the wealth from the less socially valued party to the more socially valued one.
Similarly, under a negligence rule, the payoff of the injurer is: Such arbitrariness can be explained by the excessive sensibility of the dollar value of punitive damage award to the error in the social value estimation. When deliberating a case, a jury attempts to assess the social preference (i.e., the "sense of community"), i.e., to estimate the exact value of 1 λ . Errors in such estimation are inevitable. Expression (8) shows that for a relatively large 1 λ , a small error in the estimation will not significantly affect the value of K . However, when 1 λ is very small (and a punitive damage award becomes necessary), the value of K becomes extremely sensitive to even a very small error in the estimation of 1 λ .
Consider an example where the damage caused by the injurer's activity is D . A jury tries to estimate the relative social value 1 λ . Suppose there is an estimation error 1 δλ .
The estimated value of 1 λ can fall into the range ) , ( Excessive sensitivity of the dollar value of the punitive damage award to the error in social value estimation suggests that procedures utilized for the determination of the punitive damage award must be carefully scrutinized. As indicated by ELLIS [1989] , such arbitrariness can be reduced if stricter procedures and very detailed judicial rules are developed.
Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a non-welfarist social welfare function for legal decisionmaking. The social welfare function is based on the social rationality over resources allocations and it encompasses a relative social value of each individual and a social attitude towards distributional inequality. It is derived by reinterpreting the Savage-like axioms.
As the social welfare function describes how legal decisions 'are' made instead of how legal decisions 'should' be made and as it encompasses social value judgments, the approach used in the paper can shed light on controversies in the economic analysis of law. A straightforward application of the we lfare function shows that social wealth is a defendable social value only if each individual has equal social value and the society does not care about distributional inequality. The determination of the due precaution level and the damage award depends on relative social value s of the injurer and the victim. If the victim has a higher social value, the due precaution level is strict er than the one that maximizes the total social wealth and punitive damage s will be awarded. We find that tort law implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued parties to the more socially valued parties.
Since the framework we use can incorporate social value judgments, it can be very useful for the analysis of other field of law, especially for criminal law, where value judgments play a more important role.
